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NOTE
STILL ALIVE: ANTITRUST INJURY REMAINS A
PART OF THE STANDING INQUIRY UNDER
SECTIONS 4 AND 16 OF THE CLAYTON ACT





Of course there is
You're still alive
She said
Do I deserve to be
Is that the question
And if so, . .. fso
Who answers?
Who answers?
I... I... I'm still alive.'
I. INTRODUCrION
In May of 1994, Seattle rock band Pearl Jam took on Ticket-
master. One of the most popular bands of the '90s-with domestic
* J.D., Notre Dame Law School, 1999; Clerk for the Honorable William Lee,
Chief Judge, N.D. Indiana.
1 EDDIE VEDDER OF PEARL JAM, Alive, on TEN (Sony Music Entertainment, Inc.
1991).
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album sales reaching nearly 200 million 2-PearlJam was on the verge
of launching a major concert tour. At a time when ticket prices for
live concerts were selling for as much as $100, 3 PearlJam's popularity
clearly placed it in a position to charge comparably exorbitant prices.
It was thus poised to rake in record profits, a position not to be taken
lightly in a notoriously unpredictable, flighty industry riddled with
here today, gone tomorrow acts. However, Pearl Jam chose not to
focus on profit margins but on making its concerts accessible to all of
its fans,4 deciding to limit ticket prices to eighteen dollars nation-
2 Robert Hilbrun, Working Their Way out of ajam, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 22, 1996, at 4;
see also Greg Kot, Rebels with a Cause: Other Bands Talk About Revolution; Pearl Jam Is
Actually Leading One, CHICAGO TRIB., July 9, 1995, at 7.
3 See Peter Howell, Eddie and the Dreamers in a Jam: It Didn't Have to Be Like This,
TORONTO STAR, July 4, 1995, at C7 ("When [Pearl Jam] launched its war against Tick-
etmaster last summer, rock fans were being gouged by bands like the Eagles, which
were demanding upwards of $100 per ticket, with stiff service charges of between
$3.50 to $7.50.").
4 Testifying before the Information, Justice, Transportation and Agriculture
Subcommittee of the House Committee on Government Operations on June 30,
1994, band members Stone Gossard and Jeff Ament explained,
[M]any of Pearl Jam's most loyal fans are teenagers who do not have the
money to pay $50 or more that is often charged today for tickets to a popular
concert. Although, given our popularity, we could undoubtedly continue to
sell-out our concerts with ticket prices at that premium level, we have made a
conscious decision to that we do not want to put the price of our concerts
out of the reach of many of our fans. Moreover, we do not want to be re-
sponsible for teenagers, who may be influenced by peer pressure, to feel that
they must see Pearl Jam perform, spending more money for that concert
ticket than they can really afford. All of the members of Pearl Jam know
what it is like not to have a lot of money, and we recognize that a teenager's
perceived need to see his or her favorite band in concert can often be
overwhelming.
Pearl Jam's Antitrust Complaint: Questions About Concert, Sports, and Theater
Ticket Handling Charges and Other Practices, Hearings Before the Information, Justice,
Transportation, and Agriculture Subcomm. of the House Comm. on Government Operations,
103rd Cong., 2d Sess. 11 (1994) [hereinafter Antitrust Hearing]; see also Craig Marks,
The Road Less Traveled, SPIN MAG., Feb. 1997. Pearl Jam manager Kelly Curtis
explained,
[We were] trying to keep our ticket prices low.., and we were finding that
in a lot of cases, the service charge was changing randomly. Sometimes it
would be five bucks, sometimes it would be eight, and we didn't understand
why. And the response was a very cocky Fred Rosen [president of Tick-
etmaster] saying, "If you guys are stupid enough not to make what you're
worth, then I'm going to make what you're worth." They wouldn't even
print their service charge on the tickets. It looked like we were charging,
say, twenty-six bucks for a ticket, when we were really only charging eighteen.
Id. (quoting Kelly Curtis).
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wide. 5 In line with their plan, Pearl Jam wanted to also limit any ser-
vice charges imposed on the sale of its tickets to ten percent of the
ticket price, and to have that service charge separately identified on
the ticket itself.6
Enter Ticketmaster. Ticketmaster would not agree to the $1.80
service charge cap that Pearl Jam wanted.7 While Pearl Jam had no
obligation to deal with Ticketmaster, the structure of the touring in-
dustry revealed that, in effect, Pearl Jam had little choice in the mat-
ter. In planning a tour, Pearl Jam's agent would enter into an
agreement with a promoter for a particular show or shows; the pro-
moter would then contract with a particular venue. Ticketmaster held
contracts with the majority of both promoters and venues across the
country, under which Ticketmaster possessed the exclusive right to dis-
tribute tickets for their shows, controlling approximately two-thirds of
the ticket-distribution market.8 In return, the promoters and venues
received kickbacks from a portion of the service charges Ticketmaster
collected. 9 Performers, such as Pearl Jam, received no portion of the
service charges. Thus, PearlJam's hands were tied: the venues able to
accommodate Pearl Jam and/or the promoters working with such ve-
nues were bound by Ticketmaster to deal with Ticketmaster exclu-
sively, and Ticketmaster would not agree to the ten percent service
charge. In effect, Ticketmaster
had the power to exercise virtual control to the exclusion of the
views of performers over the level of service charge imposed on tick-
ets for that band's concert that [were] sold anywhere but at the box
office.... By locking up all of the suitable venues and promoters
with arrangements of this type, Ticketmaster [had] effectively
5 See Howell, supra note 3, at C7.
6 See i& (referring to the band as "Eddie and the Dreamers"). Thus, with the
separately identified service charge, concert goers would not pay above $20 per ticket,
and the tickets themselves would clearly identify for the puchasers that $18 was the
actual ticket price for the Pearl Jam concert, with the additional $1.80 tacked on as a
service charge.
7 See Kot, supra note 2, at 7.
8 See U.S. Drops Ticketmaster Case, but N.Y Plans Antitrust Inquiry, PATRIOT LEDGER,
July 6, 1995, at 26 ("Two-thirds of the nation's 10 million concert arena seats are
governed by exclusivity contracts between Ticketmaster and arena managers, accord-
ing to the industry newsletter Pollstar.").
9 See id. The contracts are commonly "three- to five-year deals, which typically
divvy up service fees among Ticketmaster, promoters, and venues." Linda Himelstein
& Ronald Grover, Will Ticketmaster Get Scalped?, Bus. WyL, June 26, 1995, at 64 ("In
May [of 1995], Ticketmaster won the contract for the Alamodome in San Antonio by
advancing the city $100,000, installing $150,000 worth of box-office equipment, and
promising to spend $300,000 a year promoting events.").
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thwarted competition and left most bands without any meaningful
alternative for distributing tickets.10
Pearl Jam boycotted Ticketmaster, losing millions of dollars on,
and eventually canceling midway through, its 1994 tour as a result be-
cause so few "non-Ticketmaster" venues were available to them, most
of which were small and obscurely located.1 In May of 1994 Pearl
Jam officially asked the Department of Justice to investigate Tick-
etmaster, 12 which prompted the filing of various lawsuits across the
country by concert goers against Ticketmaster. i 3 Eventually resulting
in a single, consolidated complaint, the plaintiffs, as individuals and as
a class, brought an action under section 4 of the Clayton Act, alleging
nationwide antitrust violations by Ticketmaster which caused supra-
competitive prices for concert tickets.14 The Eastern District of Mis-
souri dismissed the case, holding that plaintiffs lacked "antitrust
injury.'u 5 The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling,16
and the Supreme Court denied certiorari in January of 1999.17
If the primary goals of the antitrust laws are enhancement of
competition and consumer welfare, then the district court, the Eighth
Circuit, and the Supreme Court achieved a troubling result, all thanks
to this concept of "antitrust injury." The merits of the plaintiff's sub-
10 As Gossard and Ament explained,
[T] he Ticketmaster service charge [had] in at least one case been reported
to have gone as high as $15 dollars per ticket. An informal survey of the
service charge being imposed by Ticketmaster on the events currently being
advertised in Los Angeles shows that they range from a low of $3.50 for a
ticket to an ice skating show at the Forum to $6.25 for a ticket to see either
ZZ Top or Phil Collins at the Forum orJanetJackson at Irvine Meadows to a
high of $7.25 for a ticket to see the Eagles at the Rose Bowl. On top of that,
Ticketmaster imposes an additional charge of $2.00 or more per order if the
tickets are ordered by phone.
Antitrust Hearing, supra note 4, at 14.
11 See Seanna Browder, Ticketmaster Gets Pearl Jammed, Bus. Wt., Oct. 7, 1996, at 6;
see also Kot, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining that working with non-Ticketmaster ticket
agencies to sell tickets "meant scheduling concerts at parks and fairgrounds, which
opened up a Pandora's box of logistical security and sanitation difficulties").
12 See Chuck Phillips, Pearl Jam vs. Ticketmaster: Choosing Sides, L.A. TIMES, June 8,
1994, at 1 (describing the controversy as a "holy war" between Pearl Jam and
Ticketmaster).
13 See In re Ticketmaster Corp. Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp. 1272 (E.D. Mo.
1996).
14 See id.
15 Id. at 1278.
16 See Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 865 (1999).
17 See Campos, 119 S. Ct. at 865.
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stantive allegations were never even explored by the courts, and Tick-
etmaster's domination continued. Why? Along with other standing
requirements which must be met in order to maintain a suit under
section 4,18 antitrust injury combines to form what can be explained
as "generalized" standing requirements-a checklist plaintiffs must
meet in order to bring a suit under section 4.19 Analogous to any
18 At least one author notes that "[u]nfortunately, the courts have never been
able to create an intelligible theory of private antitrust standing capable of being ap-
plied across the full range of potential cases. The law remains haphazard and incon-
sistent." HERBERT HoVENKAiP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST Poucy. THE LAW OF COMPETITION
AND ITs PRAcTIcE 543 (1994). However, while uniformity of the requirements does
exist, application and interpretation of such requirements, which this Note addresses,
has been less than uniform and clear. See, e.g., Harry G. Holz, The Robinson-Patman
Act: Standing and Antitrust Injury, The Defenses, Discrimination in Promotional Allowances
and Services, The Brokerage Provision, 777 PLI/Corp. 289, 294 (1992). Holz summarizes
that beyond the antitrust violation, the following must occur.
1) In addition to showing competitive injury generally, the plaintiff must
show that it suffered actual injury due to defendant's conduct, and that the
conduct was the material cause of the injury.
2) The plaintiff must show that the injury alleged is not too remote or dupli-
cative of the recovery of a more directly injured person (standing).
3) The plaintiff must show that the injury is of the type that the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and flows from that which makes the defend-
ants' acts unlawful (antitrust injury).
4) The plaintiff must show that the damages claimed measure the injury in a
reasonably quantifiable way.
Id. ProfessorJoseph Bauer labels as "prerequisites for maintenance" the following:
The plaintiff must demonstrate that it in fact suffered injury. It must show
that the antitrust violation was the proximate cause of the injury suffered. It
must show that this injury caused harm to its "business or property." It must
show that the injury was of the kind that the antitrust laws are intended to
protect, ie, that the harm was an "antitrust injury." It must show that among
all potential plaintiffs, it was a person whose harm was sufficiently "direct" or
who was an anticipated "target" of the antitrust violation, as to have "stand-
ing" to maintain the action. Finally, if the plaintiff was an "indirect pur-
chaser" from the defendant, it may be denied the right to recover, in favor of
a "direct purchaser" higher up the distributional chain.
EARL W. KINTNER &JOSEPH P. BAUER, 3 FEDERAL ANTrrRUST LAW § 78.1, at 3-4 (1998).
19 Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 VAND. L.
REV. 1539, 1540 (1989). There are disagreements regarding exactly what antitrust
injury is, with commentators debating whether it is a standing requirement or an
analytically distinct element. See, e.g., Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cali-
fornia State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 535 n.31 (1983).
The label "antitrust standing" has traditionally been applied to some of the
elements of this inquiry. As commentators have observed, the focus of the
doctrine of "antitrust standing" is somewhat different from that of standing
as a constitutional doctrine. Harm to the antitrust plaintiff is sufficient to
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standing requirement, without the presence of antitrust injury a plain-
tiff cannot maintain a suit under section 4 regardless of whether a
defendant did in fact violate the antitrust laws. Thus, without a quali-
fied plaintiff, the courts did not need to address the substantive issue
of Ticketmaster's alleged antitrust violations.
This Note explores the private enforcement of the antitrust laws,
specifically delving into this concept of "antitrust injury" and the rela-
tionship of antitrust injury to the other standing requirements.20 It
examines three recent appellate court cases, all of which reached in-
satisfy the constitutional standing requirement of injury in fact, but the court
must make a further determination whether the plaintiff is a proper party to
bring a private antitrust action [i.e., the antitrust injury inquiry].
Id.; see alsoJo Culver Dearing, Maximum Resale Price Maintenance and the Antitrust Injury
Requirement: USA Petroleum Co. v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 58 U. CIN. L. REv. 689, 693
(1989).
Although an analytic similarity exists between the standing requirement in
antitrust cases and the antitrust injury requirement, the two are not synony-
mous. The object of a standing requirement is "to identify the most efficient
plaintiff or plaintiffs from among those who have suffered antitrust injury."
Once those who have standing have been identified, the court must deter-
mine whether the plaintiff or plaintiffs have, in fact, suffered an antitrust
injury that would allow a damage recovery under section 4 of the Clayton
Act.
Id. (quoting William H. Page, The Scope of Liability for Antitrust Violations, 37 STAN. L.
REv. 1445, 1484 (1985)); Anthony E. DiResta et al., "Antitrust Injury". The Substantive
and Procedural Impact of Brunswick, C695 ALI-ABA 211, 213-14 (1991) ("Although
intimately connected with the doctrine of standing, the concept of 'antitrust injury' is
far from a preliminary procedural hurdle Rather, it has developed as a substantive
'causation' element of antitrust claims.") (footnotes omitted).
Blair and Harrison provide an explanation that reconciles the relationship be-
tween standing requirements under section 4 and antitrust injury: "Technically, stand-
ing requirements limit the array of potential plaintiffs while antitrust injury
requirements limits the types of compensable harms. Together, however, they form a
generalized standing requirement: a list of conditions a plaintiff must satisfy before
qualifying to proceed to the substantive antitrust question." Blair & Harrison, supra,
at 1540.
The label placed on "antitrust injury" is really quite inconsequential. The bottom
line is that antitrust injury is indeed a prerequisite to maintaining a suit under section
4 of the Clayton Act. It works with the other standing requirements to narrow the
class of eligible plaintiffs under section 4. "Standing, antitrust injury, and even causa-
tion are equally significant in that the absence of any of them deprives the plaintiff of
the cause of action even if the defendant violated the antitrust laws." Holz, supra note
18.
20 It is very difficult to solely focus on antitrust injury without also addressing
other standing requirements. As such, the coverage of the three appellate cases in




correct results on the issue of antitrust injury. Part I explores the sec-
tion 4 action, highlighting the development of the antitrust injury
requirement by the Supreme Court. Part II then examines the Tick-
etmaster case, concluding under the Supreme Court case of Blue
Shield v. McCready 21 that Campos and his class had standing to bring
their claim for treble damages. Part HI covers City of Pittsburgh v. West
Penn Power Co.2 2 and concludes that the Third Circuit erroneously
ruled on the merits of the plaintiff's antitrust allegations by skipping
over the initial inquiry of antitrust injury. As a result, the Third Cir-
cuit incorrectly held that the plaintiff did not suffer antitrust injury.
Part IV examines the Second Circuit case of George Haug Co. v. Rolls
Royce Motor Cars, Inc.2 3 and concludes that the court labeled its hold-
ing in terms of "antitrust injury" but in reality dismissed the plaintiffs
case for failure to adequately allege his antitrust claims. All three
cases reached incorrect results on the issue of antitrust injury, re-
vealing that courts, including the Supreme Court, are incorrectly in-
terpreting and applying the established guidelines governing antitrust
injury analysis and in some cases skipping the inquiry altogether.
II. SECTION 4 OF THE CLAYTON AcT & THE REQUIREMENT OF
"ANTiTRUST NJuR"-A HuRDLE EVERY PLAiNrmF MUST MEET TN
ORDER TO ENFORCE THE ANTITRUST LAWs
In 1977, the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Bruns-
wick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,24 and unveiled the concept of "an-
titrust injury" to the world, forever changing the focus of private
antitrust litigation. The Court would have the opportunity to address
the issue on six more occasions. What ultimately resulted was a stand-
ing inquiry that every private plaintiff must survive before a court ad-
dresses the substance and merits of the actual antitrust violations
alleged by that plaintiff.
A. Section 4 of the Clayton Act
The treble damages remedy of section 4 of the Clayton Act allows
enforcement of the antitrust laws by private persons. As a matter of
precision, however, a plaintiff does not allege a claim under section 4.
Rather, the language of section 4 "implicitly incorporates" sections 1
and 2 of the Sherman Act,25 sections 3 and 7 of the Clayton Act,26 and
21 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
22 147 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 1998).
23 148 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1998).
24 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
25 Sherman Act §§ 1-2, 15 U.S.C. § 1-2 (1992).
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the Robinson-Patman Act.27 Thus, section 4 does not "itself provide
the benchmark for illegality, and the existence of illegal conduct is
not an element of the 'standing' inquiry."28
Section 4 simply states that
any person who shall be injured in his business or property by rea-
son of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws may sue there-
fore .... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained,
and the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee.29
Congress conceived section 4 in line with the two, broad funda-
mental purposes of the antitrust laws themselves: to preserve competi-
tion and to protect consumers.30 While a literal reading of the statute
appears to encompass every harm relating to antitrust violations,3'
from 1899 to 1939 private antitrust actions were rare.3 2 From 1939 to
1977, however, a lowering of procedural burdens for antitrust plain-
tiffs resulted in a surge of private antitrust litigation.33 Then, in 1977,
26 Clayton Act §§ 3, 7, 15 U.S.C. §§ 14, 18 (1992).
27 Robinson-Patman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1992).
28 3 KINTNER & BAUER, supra note 18, § 78.1, at 2 n.8.
29 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1992). The private antitrust treble-damage remedy has existed
for over a century, first appearing in the Sherman Act, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat. 209
(1890), and ultimately moving to section 4 of the Clayton Act. SeeJonathan M.Jacob-
son & Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the Alley with Brunswick v.
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 ANTrTRusT L.J. 273, 274-77 (1998) (discussing substantively
the history of this action).
30 See Kathleen Chouai, Note, Discharged Employees and Treble Damages: The Outer
Limits of "Antitrust Injury," 44 U. Pr-r. L. RExv. 1005, 1035-36 (1983) (providing a com-
prehensive discussion of the legislative history of section 4).
31 See DiResta et al., supra note 19, at 214-15 ("The Act is comprehensive in its
terms and coverage, protecting all who are made victims of the forbidden practices by
whomever they may be perpetrated." (citing Mandeville Island Farms, Inc. v. Ameri-
can Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948))).
32 SeeJacobson & Greer, supra note 29, at 275 (noting that from 1899 to 1939,
"only 157 treble damage actions were recorded, with only 14 recoveries by plaintiffs,
totaling less than $275,000").
33 See, e.g., Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968)
(eliminating the defense that plaintiff suffered no harm from an increased price if the
increase was passed along to its customers); Poller v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 368
U.S. 464 (1962) (making it difficult for a defendant to prevail on summary judg-
ment); Radiant Burners, Inc. v. People's Gas, Light & Coke Co., 364 U.S. 656 (1961);
Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc., 359 U.S. 207 (1959) (establishing that there
was no requirement that a plaintiff demonstrate any "public harm"); Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946) (relaxing standard for proving damages);
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940) (establishing per se
rule); United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392 (1927) (leading to the
establishment of a per se rule); Jacobson & Greer, supra note 29, at 276-77. As a
result, from "1945 to 1949, there were 399 private cases. From 1950 to 1954, the
[VOL. 75:2
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the Supreme Court decided the landmark case of Brunswick v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.,34 responding to this expansion in private litigation
and introducing the concept of "antitrust injury," ultimately changing
the focus of all private antitrust litigation.
B. The Introduction of the Concept of Antitrust Injury-Brunswick
Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc.
In the 1960s, the bowling industry went into a major decline. As
a result, Brunswick, one of the two largest manufacturers of bowling
equipment in the country,3 5 acquired numerous defaulting bowling
centers, thereby hoping to produce positive cash flow.3 6 Treadway
Companies brought a section 4 suit against Brunswick, alleging that
Brunswick's acquisition and operation of bowling centers in the three
markets in which Treadway also operated "might substantially lessen
competition or tend to create a monopoly."37 Treadway sought treble
damages for the "reasonably expectable profits" that Treadway would
have made had Brunswick not also been a competitor in those three
markets, i.e. if Brunswick had instead allowed those acquired centers
to close.38
Eventually, the Supreme Court held that in order for Treadway to
recover treble damages resulting from an alleged antitrust violation
[t]hey must prove more than injury causally linked to an illegal
presence in the market Plaintiffs must prove antitrust injury, which
is to say injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to pre-
numberjumped to 1002. The figure doubled again in the five-year period beginning
in 1960." Id. at 276. Jacobson and Greer noted that things were so extreme that "a
leading business school text on competitive strategy was urging firms to commence
antitrust litigation as a strategic device to halt competitors' growth and discipline
competitive behavior." Id. at 277 (citing MICHAEL PORTER, COMPETITIVE STRATEGY
85-86 (1980)).
34 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
35 See id. at 479.
36 Brunswick made most of its sales on credit, and when the bowling industry
went into a major decline in the 1960s, over $100,000,000 of Brunswick's accounts
were at least 90 days overdue. See id.
[B]y the end of 1964 over $100,000,000, or more than 25% of [Brunswick's]
accounts were more than 90 days delinquent. Repossessions rose dramati-
cally, but attempts to sell or lease the repossessed equipment met with only
limited success. Because [Brunswick] had borrowed close to $250,000,000 to
finance its credit sales it was, as the Court of Appeals concluded, "in serious
financial difficulty."
Id.
37 Id. at 480.
38 See id. at 481.
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vent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlaw-
ful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of
the violation or of anticompetitive acts made possible by the viola-
tion. It should, in short, be "the type of loss that the claimed viola-
tions ... would be likely to cause."3 9
Refusing to divorce section 4 from the primary goals of the anti-
trust laws, it was not enough for Treadway to merely prove a loss of
profits due to its decreased market share because Brunswick acquired
the defaulting bowling centers instead of letting them fail.40 Tread-
way needed to prove "antitrust injury," which it was unable to do. Fol-
lowing Brunswick's acquisition of the centers, Treadway faced a
rejuvenated and aggressive competitor, and the harm which Treadway
suffered resulted from an increase in competition, exactly what the
antitrust laws were intended to protect and preserve. As the Court
explained, even if the plaintiffs were injured "by reason of" the unlaw-
ful acquisitions by Brunswick, they were not injured "'by reason of'
what made the acquisitions unlawful."41 Because Treadway had not
suffered antitrust injury, it could not maintain a claim for treble dam-
ages under section 4.
C. Brunswick Merely Got the Ball Rolling-The Development of
"Antitrust Injury"
With Brunswick, in a mere forty-one words, the Court changed the
focus of every private plaintiffs case under section 4. But the Court
did not stop there. The Court has addressed the issue of antitrust
injury six more times since 1977. Considered in chronological order,
the following discussion briefly traces the Supreme Court's develop-
ment of the concept of antitrust injury.
1. J Truett Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.
In 1981, the Court further elaborated on Brunswick in J Truett
Payne Co. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,42 holding that a plaintiff is not enti-
tled to treble damages under section 4 simply by showing a violation
39 Id. at 489 (emphasis added) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltime Re-
search, Inc., 395 U.S. 100, 125 (1969)).
40 See Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 485-87.
41 Id. at 488 (" [I]f [Treadway was] injured, it was not by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws."). As one commentator noted, the injury alleged by
Treadway resulted "from the entrance of a 'deep pocket' parent company into a mar-
ket of 'pygmies.'" Anthony Tedesco, Recent Decisions: Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo-
rado, Inc., 107 S. Ct. 484 (1986), 26 DuQ. L. REv. 107, 117 (1987).
42 451 U.S. 557 (1981).
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of the antitrust laws-a violation does not equate with the presence of
"antitrust injury." Mere proof of price discrimination under section
2 (a) of the Robinson-Patman Act by Chrysler against one of its car
dealers did not establish antitrust injury-rather, to "recover treble
damages... a plaintiff must make some showing of actual injury at-
tributable to something the antitrust laws were designed to prevent."43 Thus,
"automatic damages" did not exist.
2. Blue Shield v. McCready
The Court in Blue Shield v. McCready44 addressed the relationship
between the "indirect purchaser" doctrine 45 and antitrust injury. The
Court held that, in the absence of a risk of duplicative recovery-one
of the goals of the "indirect purchaser" doctrine-a plaintiff was not
barred from bringing a claim under Section 4 where the plaintiff was
a "necessary and foreseeable" victim of the defendant's antitrust viola-
tions.46 Once the hurdle of the "indirect purchaser" doctrine was
cleared, the Court then held that antitrust injury existed because the
43 Id. at 562 (emphasis added). Specifically, the plaintiffs had alleged a violation
of Section 2 (a) of the Clayton Act, as amended by the Robinson-Patman Act. Section
2(a) required only proof that an injury may result. To have equated a violation of
Section 2 (a) with the presence of antitrust injury would have, in effect, established a
theory of "automatic damages."
44 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
45 Established primarily through three Supreme Court cases, the theory is that
[t]he direct customer from a person which violated the antitrust laws may
successfully assert a claim for treble damages against its supplier; the defend-
ant is precluded from asserting that any higher price, or overcharge, result-
ing from its illegal conduct was in turn "passed on" to the plaintiff's
customers. The other side of the coin from this proposition is that in most
cases, a person who paid an inflated price because of the antitrust violation,
but who did not deal directly with the defendant, i.e., the "indirect pur-
chaser," will be foreclosed from bringing the action, although it in fact suf-
fered some "injury."
3 KrN'NR & BAUER, supra note 18, § 78.8(a), at 72; see also Kansas v. Utilicorp United,
Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990); Illinois Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Hanover
Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481 (1968).
There is debate regarding whether the indirect purchaser doctrine is really a
standing requirement. "In both Illinois Brick and McCready the Supreme Court stated
that the question of which persons have been injured for purposes of section 4 is
'analytically distinct' from the question of which persons have sustained injuries too
remote to give them standing to sue for damages." Holz, supra note 18, at 305. But
many courts continue to treat indirect purchaser inquiries as matters of standing. See
id. at 306 (quoting Kansas v. Utilicorp United, Inc., 497 U.S. 199 (1990)); Schwimmer
v. Sony Corp., 637 F.2d 41 (2d Cir. 1980); Chatham Brass Co. v. Honeywell, Inc., 512
F. Supp. 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
46 See Blair & Harrison, supra note 19, at 1547.
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injury suffered by the plaintiff-consumers was so "inextricably inter-
twined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict" as to justify
recovery under section 4.47
3. Associated General Contractors of California, Inc. v. California State
Council of Carpenters
In 1983, the Supreme Court decided Associated General Contractors
of California, Inc. v. Calfornia State Council of Carpenters,48 which pro-
duced a "laundry list" of standing inquiries, including antitrust injury.
The Court held that the plaintiff in Associated General, a labor union,
had not suffered antitrust injury-not only was the labor union
neither a competitor nor a consumer, but it could actually be harmed
by uninhibited competition.49 Further, the Court noted that "better"
plaintiffs existed-namely the actual members of the union who lost
profits due to the defendants' alleged conspiracy to avoid contracts
with union members. 50 What resulted from the opinion was a list of
factors used by the Court to determined that the union was not in-
jured by reason of a violation of the antitrust laws under section 4:
[T]he Union's allegations of consequential harm resulting from a
violation of the antitrust laws, although buttressed by an allegation
of intent to harm the Union, [were] insufficient as a matter of law.
Other relevant factors-the nature of the Union's injury, the tenu-
ous and speculative character of the relationship between the al-
leged antitrust violation and the Union's alleged injury, the
potential for duplicative recovery or complex apportionment of
47 McCready, 475 U.S. at 484.
48 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
49 See id. at 539 ("[A] union's primary goal is to enhance the earnings and im-
prove the working conditions of its membership; that goal is not necessarily served,
and indeed may actually be harmed, by uninhibited competition among employers
striving to reduce costs in order to obtain a competitive advantage over their rivals.").
50 See id. at 540-41. The Court noted that if "there is substance to the Union's
claim, it is difficult to understand why these direct victims of the conspiracy have not
asserted any claim in their own right," suggesting perhaps that no victims existed. Id.
at 542 n.47.
Arguably, Associated General backtracks from McCready insofar as the union was
denied standing because the intended victims of the alleged boycott were the contrac-
tors and subcontractors themselves who stood to lose contracts, rather than the union
that represented them. However, unlike McCready, in Associated General the employ-
ees, rather than the union, constituted the "more direct" victims of the alleged boy-
cott. Perhaps what Associated General establishes, then, is not a weakening of
McCready's "inextricably intertwined" language, but rather, only that a weaker pre-
sumption of standing exists when plaintiffs are not the immediately intended victims
of the alleged antitrust violation. If so, an exploration of the factors analyzed by the
Court in Associated General may bolster a plaintiff's case or destroy it.
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damages, and the existence of more direct victims of the alleged
conspiracy-weigh heavily against judicial enforcement of the
Union's antitrust claim.5 '
4. Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.
In Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp.,52 the
Court held that antitrust injury did not exist when the defendants'
alleged conspiracy among plaintiffs' competitors resulted in higher
prices than would have resulted in a purely competitive environ-
ment.53 In effect, the plaintiff could not recover damages under sec-
tion 4 for "any conspiracy by [defendants] to charge higher than
competitive prices in the American market" or "for a conspiracy to
impose nonprice restraints that have the effect of either raising mar-
ket price or limiting output."54 While such conduct violated the Sher-
man Act, under the standard set in Brunswick such behavior
potentially benefitted plaintiffs as competitors by making supracom-
petitive pricing more attractive.5 5 Thus, plaintiffs did not suffer anti-
trust injury.
51 Id. at 545. A criticism of the Court's opinion also arises in light of these fac-
tors. It would have been enough for the Court to determine that under Brunswick,
plaintiffs failed to prove antitrust injury"-the union's alleged injury did not ade-
quately reflect the anticompetitive effect of the alleged conspiracy. Instead, the Court
went forward with its analysis, appearing "to integrate antitrust injury into a multi-
factor analysis of entitlement to sue under the antitrust laws, which, the Court ac-
knowledged, was inherently imprecise." Id. As a result, this "multi-factored balancing
analysis introduced by Associated General appeared to provide a license to the lower
courts to engage in imprecise, outcome-oriented decision making." Jacobson &
Greer, supra note 29, at 292-93. The result has been a number of confused decisions
in the lower courts. Perhaps the most instructive aspect of the Court's analysis in
Associated General is the realization that all of these "standing" requirements are inter-
twined, often making it difficult for a court to precisely identify exactly what prerequi-
site for maintaining a suit under section 4 is absent.
52 475 U.S. 574 (1986).
53 See id. at 584.
54 Id. at 583. The Court also mentioned that Zenith and NUE could not recover
antitrust damages "based solely on an alleged cartelization of the Japanese market,
because American antitrust laws do not regulate the competitive conditions of other
nations' economies." Id. at 582.
55 See id. at 583 (conceding that while such behavior potentially benefitted Zenith
and NUE as competitors of the defendant, such behavior did harm competition).
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5. Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort Colorado, Inc.
In Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort Colorado, Inc.,5 6 the Court extended the
antitrust injury requirement to injunctions sought under section 16 of
the Clayton Act.57 In contrast to the injury required under section 4,
however, the Court identified two distinctions regarding antitrust in-
jury under section 16, the first that there may be a smaller showing of
the amount of injury under section 16 than that which is needed for
damages under section 4. Additionally, while section 4 required proof
of injury that had already occurred, section 16 allowed injunctive re-
lief for merely threatened injury. Beyond those two minor distinc-
tions, the Court held the inquiry under section 16 consistent with that
required by section 4. However, the Court still held that antitrust in-
jury was not present in the plaintiff's claim: a competitor did not suf-
fer antitrust injury for purposes of section 16 even though the
proposed merger of two of the plaintiff's competitors may reduce the
plaintiff's profits due to threatened price competition.5 8
6. Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.
The Court's most recent discussion of antitrust injury is in Atlan-
tic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.,59 in which an independent retailer
of gasoline brought a section 4 action against an oil company for max-
imum price fixing. The Court held that in the absence of evidence of
predatory pricing, a finding of antitrust injury could not be sustained.
In effect, the plaintiff suffered no antitrust injury due to alleged lower
prices produced by the vertical restraint because, so long as prices
stayed above a predatory level, any loss which the plaintiff suffered did
not result from anticompetitive behavior. The Court stated, "A firm
complaining about the harm it suffers from nonpredatory price com-
petition 'is really claiming that it [is] unable to raise prices.'- 60 Thus,
56 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
57 Section 16 of the Clayton Act provides that "[alny person, firm, corporation,
or association shall be entitled to sue for and have injunctive relief, in any court of the
United States having jurisdiction over the parties, against threatened loss or damage
by a violation of the antitrust laws." Clayton Act § 16, 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1992).
58 See Cargill 479 U.S. at 122. It is important to note that in Cargill the Court held
that the plaintiff did not show the potential for antitrust injury. In so doing, "the
Court expressly left open the possibility that a competitor who challenges an acquisi-
tion may pass the section 16 antitrust injury test by alleging that the new firm is likely
to engage in predatory conduct." Blair & Harrison, supra note 19, at 1550-51 (em-
phasis added).
59 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
60 Id. at 337-38 (quoting Blair & Harrison, supra note 19, at 1554); see id, at 337
(explaining that a competitor "may not complain of conspiracies that, for example,
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the Court affirmed earlier antitrust decisions in three ways: antitrust
injury requires that the plaintiff sustain a loss from anticompetitive be-
havior; a per se antitrust violation does not equate to antitrust injury;
and if anyone is suited to bring a section 4 claim for vertical, maxi-
mum price fixing, it is not a competitor, but rather the consumers or
the defendant's own dealers. 61
D. Antitrust Injury Currently
From the above discussion of antitrust injury, along with the
other prerequisites needed to maintain a suit for treble damages, it
would appear that district courts have a very well-defined and straight-
forward job ahead of them. However, a reading of any antitrust case
reveals how very fact-specific antitrust law is. Additionally, as Parts II,
m, and IV of this Note reveal, difficulty in applying and interpreting
the standing requirements, along with the confusion that arises from
the overlapping of such requirements, has resulted in some troubling
and incorrect decisions.
Ill. CAMpos v. Tmci 'fwas= CoRp AND ANTRlUST INJURY
A. The Eighth Circuit's Take on Campos
1. Background
Following a long procedural history,62 plaintiffs in Campos-
brought a section 4 action seeking treble damages, asserting that
Ticketmaster
[v]iolated § 1 of the Sherman Act by engaging in price fixing with
various concert venues and promoters and by boycotting the band
Pearl Jam; that Ticketmaster violated § 2 of the Sherman Act by
set maximum prices above market levels, or that set minimum prices at any level"
(quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8
(1986))).
61 See Holz, supra note 19, at 299 (1992). Holz notes that the Court "declined to
dilute the antitrust injury requirement here because it found that there is no need to
encourage private enforcement by competitors of the rule against vertical, maximum
price fixing." Id. at 299-300; see also Roger D. Blair &John E. Lopatka, The Albrecht
Rule After Khan: Death Becomes Her, 74 NorRE DAME L. REV. 123, 135-141 (1998).
62 In 1994, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation transferred 16 cases to
the Eastern District of Missouri. In all 16 suits, the plaintiff was either an individual or
group of individuals who had purchased tickets from Ticketmaster. The district court
consolidated the 16 cases for pretrial proceedings, dismissing 11 of the cases. The
plaintiffs in the remaining five then filed a consolidated complaint against Tick-
etmaster. See In re Ticketmaster Corp. Antitrust Litig., 929 F. Supp. 1272, 1275 (E.D.
Mo. 1996).
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monopolizing, or attempting to monopolize, the market for ticket
distribution services; and that Ticketmaster violated § 7 of the Clay-
ton Act by acquiring its competitors. 65
The plaintiffs argued that as a result, Ticketmaster possessed the con-
trol to extract "supracompetitive" fees from concert goers.64 Tick-
etmaster in turn argued that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue under
section 4 due to their inability to show a "direct link to the market to
give them antitrust standing based on an antitrust damage." 65
The district court dismissed the suit on two alternative theories,
one of which was antitrust injury. At the direction of the Eighth Cir-
cuit, the district court found the antitrust injury prong of the Associ-
ated General test dispositive 66 and held that plaintiffs failed to suffer
antitrust injury. The Eighth Circuit directed that for the district court
to find antitrust injury, a mere causal connection would not suffice:
"The [plaintiffs] must have been the target of the anticompetitive ac-
tivity, not one who has merely suffered indirect, secondary, or remote
injury."67 Applying what appeared to be the "indirect purchaser" doc-
trine, as opposed to antitrust injury analysis, 68 the district court held
that the concert venues and promoters, rather than the purchasers of
the tickets, were the more appropriate plaintiffs, because the promot-
ers and venues were not only targets of Ticketmaster's alleged anti-
trust behavior but were also consumers of Ticketmaster's product and
as a result suffered the direct loss due to Ticketmaster's alleged anti-
trust behavior. 69 Thus, in effect, the court determined that the plain-
tiffs were too indirect to have suffered antitrust injury.
In the alternative, even if the antitrust injury element was not dis-
positive, the district court held that plaintiffs lack standing because
they "fail[ed] other elements of the [Associated General ] test."70 Spe-
cifically, damages would be "speculative" and apportionment "com-
plex" because ticket prices depended upon the demand of the
featured artist and there would be additional difficulty in properly
63 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1168 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 865 (1999); see also In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp. at 1276.
64 Campos, 140 F.3d at 1169.
65 In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp. at 1276.
66 See id. at 1277 ("The Eighth Circuit has recognized that the antitrust injury
element of the Contractors test is potentially dispositive in a standing analysis." (quot-
ing Lovett v. General Motors Corp., 975 F.2d 518, 520 (8th Cir. 1992))).
67 Id. (quoting Lovett, 975 F.2d at 520).
68 See Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982) (providing an explanation of
the indirect purchaser doctrine).
69 See In re Ticketmaster, 929 F.Supp. at 1277.
70 Id. at 1277.
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identifying members of the class because many tickets were often
charged to one credit card account. 71 Additionally, the district court
noted the risk of duplicative recovery, as the concert venues and pro-
moters could quickly follow plaintiffs' lead, "transforming treble dam-
ages against Ticketmaster into an exponential award. '72
2. The Eighth Circuit Majority
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of the
plaintiffs' claim for damages under section 4, holding that plaintiffs
were indirect purchasers under llinois Brick Co. v. Illinois 73 and thus
were barred from collecting treble damages. The court's discussion of
the indirect-purchaser doctrine spanned three pages of its opinion,
with the court concluding that "[t]he plaintiffs' inability to obtain
ticket delivery services in a competitive market [was] simply the conse-
quence of the antecedent inability of venues to do so."74 In other
words, the venues themselves had to pay the service fees first to obtain
Ticketmaster's services, and the ticket buyers in turn bought from the
venues, constituting "derivative dealing[,] ... the essence of indirect
purchaser status." 75
The court, however, reversed the district court's ruling that plain-
tiffs lacked standing to seek injunctive relief under section 16 of the
Clayton Act. The court relied on Cargill noting that a plaintiff who
lacked standing to sue under section 4 may still have standing to seek
injunctive relief under section 16 for the threat of antitrust injury
thanks to the lack of risk of duplicative recovery and tracing
problems.76
3. The Wrong Result
The Eighth Circuit and the district court reached the incorrect
result in Campos. Perhaps the most confusing aspect of both opinions
stems from the intermingling of two different maintenance require-
ments: the indirect purchaser doctrine and antitrust injury. The dis-
trict court jumped from "direct loss" language to its conclusion that
71 Id. at 1277-78.
72 Id. at 1278.
73 431 U.S. 720 (1977); see also Blue Shield, 457 U.S. at 465 (providing an explana-
tion of the indirect purchaser doctrine).
74 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1171 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 865 (1999).
75 Id.
76 See id. at 1172 (citing Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., 479 U.S. 104, 111 n.6
(1986)).
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plaintiffs did not suffer antitrust injury because the venues were the
consumers and suffered the direct loss. 77 While the Eighth Circuit
affirmed the district court's dismissal of the section 4 claim, the hold-
ing turned on the indirect purchaser doctrine, without a mention of
antitrust injury. The Eighth Circuit then quickly reversed the district
court on the issue of standing under section 16, explaining briefly that
since indirect purchaser status does not bar a section 16 claim, the
"pleadings establish [ed] antitrust standing to seek injunctive relief. '78
So was antitrust injury present?
B. McCready and Campos-A Better Duo
The error in both the district and the appellate courts' analyses
did not result from the use of the Associated General factors-the case,
while not factually analogous to Campos,79 was instructive and identi-
fied the standing factors courts must consider under section 4. Nor
was the indirect purchaser doctrine an inappropriate consideration in
a claim for treble damages. However, both courts reached incorrect
results on both issues. Following the Supreme Court's analysis in Blue
Shield v. McCready,80 Campos and his class were not barred by the indi-
rect purchaser doctrine and they sufficiently alleged antitrust injury to
maintain their suit for treble damages.
1. Blue Shield v. McCready Up Close
In McCready, McCready and her class received medical insurance
under a prepaid group health plan purchased by their employers
from Blue Shield. Blue Shield provided coverage for psychotherapy
services performed by psychiatrists but not for psychologists unless
such psychologist was under the supervision of a physician.81 Mc-
Cready and her class obtained treatment from clinical psychologists
who were not under the supervision of physicians, and thus, Mc-
Cready and her class were ineligible for reimbursement under the
77 See In re Ticketmaster, 929 F. Supp. at 1277.
78 Campos, 140 F.3d at 1172.
79 Associated General involved a labor union that itself did not suffer antitrust in-
jury and did not constitute a consumer nor a competitor. See Associated General Con-
tractors of California, Inc., 459 U.S. 519 (1983). The individual union members were
more likely to have suffered antitrust injury because they lost profits and work under
the defendants' alleged coercion of third parties to hire non-union contractors and
subcontractors. However, the factors which the Court identified in its analysis are
instructive on the issue of antitrust standing, including one which raises the inquiry of
whether a plaintiff suffered antitrust injury. See id.
80 457 U.S. 465 (1982).
81 See id. at 468.
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plan. The complaint alleged a section 1 violation of the Sherman
Act-that the defendants had engaged in an unlawful conspiracy "to
exclude and boycott clinical psychologists from receiving compensa-
tion under the Blue Shield plans" and that Blue Shield's failure to
reimburse had been "in furtherance of the alleged conspiracy."82
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan first addressed the con-
cern that McCready and her class were indirect purchasers83 and thus
were barred from recovery under section 4. With regard to McCready
and her class, the Court explained that a risk of duplicative recovery
was not present because these subscribers were not reimbursed by
Blue Shield. Therefore, McCready and her class suffered the loss,
since the psychologists received payments directly from the subscrib-
ers and the employers (as purchasers of the plans) experienced no
financial loss themselves.84 The Court found no risk of duplicative
recovery, concluding that McCready and her class's claim withstood
this limitation placed upon section 4 recovery.
In the absence of a risk of multiple liability, the Court "framed
the McCready standing issue in terms of how remote the plaintiff may
be before falling outside the scope of section 4 coverage," 85 looking to
the physical and economic nexus between the alleged violation and
the harm to the plaintiff, and... more particularly, to the relation-
ship of the injury alleged with those forms of injury about which
Congress was likely to have been concerned in making defendant's
conduct unlawful and in providing a private remedy under § 4.86
This first inquiry dealt with the issue of remoteness. The Court made
clear that the availability of section 4 did not depend upon the intent
of the conspirators, but "[w] here the injury alleged [was] so integral
an aspect of the conspiracy alleged, there [could] be no question that
the loss was precisely 'the type of loss that the claimed viola-
tions . . . would be likely to cause."' 8 7 McCready and her class,
"although neither competitor[s] nor literally consumer[s], [were]
foreseeable and necessary victim[s] of the reimbursement agreement.
The harm, thus, was not so fortuitous or incidental as to fall outside
the protection of section 4.1"88
82 Id. at 470 (internal quotations omitted).
83 See ia- at 472-75.
84 See id. at 475-76.
85 Blair & Harrison, supra note 19, at 1547.
86 Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465, 478 (1982).
87 Id. at 479 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
489 (1977) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
125 (1969))).
88 Blair & Harrison, supra note 19, at 1547.
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The Court then explored the second issue which dealt with the
requirement of antitrust injury. Defendant argued that since Mc-
Cready did not pay higher rates for psychiatric services or claim resul-
tant elevated psychologist rates, there was not antitrust injury to
McCready. However, the Court determined that the defendant's sug-
gestions did not exhaust the possibilities under section 4 and held
that McCready and her class did suffer antitrust injury: McCready
"could seek the services of a psychiatrist, in which case the anticompe-
titive impact would have been felt by psychologists, or she could make
use of a psychologist and forgo reimbursement. [McCready and her
class] chose the latter route, leading to a higher net cost of psycholog-
ical services."8 9 Thus, "[a]lthough McCready was not a competitor of
the conspirators, the injury she suffered [these higher net costs] was
inextricably intertwined with the injury the conspirators sought to inflict
on psychologists and the psychotherapy market,"90 constituting anti-
trust injury under section 4. McCready was thus free to pursue her
action for treble damages.
2. The Effect on Campos
The McCready analysis is instructive on three levels when analyz-
ing Campos. First, the McCready case quickly dismisses the Eighth Cir-
cuit's conclusion that Campos and his class were barred from bringing
suit under the indirect purchaser doctrine. The Court in McCready
held that due to the absence of duplicative recovery, McCready and
her class could maintain their suit for treble damages. Similarly, there
was no risk of duplicative recovery in Campos. Unlike the traditional
"chain of distribution" scenario, 91 the venues and promoters did not
purchase tickets from Ticketmaster subject to a service charge and
then resell those tickets to concert goers, passing on a portion of the
service charge. Rather, the venues and promoters voluntarily entered
into contracts with Ticketmaster, paid no portion of the service
charge, and even received a portion of the service charge from Tick-
etmaster. Thus, just like the employers and psychologists in McCready,
the venues and promoters suffered no injury, and just like McCready
and her class who paid for their treatment, the plaintiffs in Cam-
pos bore the entire service charge. With this risk of duplicative recov-
ery eliminated, the indirect purchaser doctrine lost its very purpose,
and the Eighth Circuit wrongly applied the doctrine, incorrectly bar-
ring Campos and his class from pursuing their claim.
89 Id. at 1548.
90 McCready, 457 U.S. at 483-84 (emphasis added).
91 See id. at 465 (providing an explanation of the indirect purchaser doctrine).
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With that hurdle cleared, the McCready Court next focused on
remoteness. Similar to McCready, the exorbitant service charges im-
posed by Ticketmaster clearly resulted in "the type of loss that the
claimed violations... would be likely to cause."92 McCready and her
class were neither competitors nor consumers, yet the Court still
found them within the scope of section 4 because McCready and her
class were foreseeable and necessary victims.93 In Campos, the plaintiffs
clearly constituted consumers of Ticketmaster's ticket distribution and
information network, not the venues and promoters who bore no por-
tion of the overcharge and, in some cases, received some portion of
the overcharge in the form of a kickback.
If anything, Campos presented an even stronger case for treble
damages, given that the concert goers had no choice in ticket distribu-
tors' services. As the dissent in McCready highlighted, "The fact that
[McCready] voluntarily elected to spend money for services not cov-
ered by his insurance policy would have no greater legal significance
than a similar voluntary decision by a person who was not a Blue
Shield subscriber."94 Similarly, the venues and promoters voluntarily
entered into exclusive contracts with Ticketmaster. It was the concert
goers who had no choice in which ticket-distribution services they
used. If McCready and her class, who willingly sought uncovered
treatment from psychologists (arguably the target of the alleged con-
spiracy), were not too remote, then clearly the purchasers of tickets
bearing service charges imposed by Ticketmaster constituted even
"more" foreseeable and necessary victims of antitrust violations. Cam-
pos and his class were not so fortuitous or incidental as to fall outside
the protection of section 4.
Lastly, McCready held that the plaintiffs suffered antitrust injury.
Even though the conspiracy was aimed at the psychologists and the
psychotherapy market, the higher net costs for psychological services
92 Id. at 479 (citing Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477,
489 (1977) (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 395 U.S. 100,
125 (1969))).
93 See id at 479.
94 Id at 494 (Stevens, J., dissenting). In effect, McCready had three options: go
to a psychiatrist, go to a psychologist under the supervision of a physician, or go to a
psychologist and pay for it. In the case of the plaintiffs in Campos, there really was no
choice since the promoters and venues chose Ticketmaster, and Ticketmaster had the
exclusive right to distribute tickets for those venues.
One could argue that Campos and his class, too, had an option-purchase tickets
at the box office and avoid service charges. However, geographical distance could
prove this quite difficult and inconvenient. Additionally, given that popular shows are
selling out in less than an hour over the phone using Ticketmaster, the box office is
not a viable option in many cases.
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resulting from McCready and her class's decision to seek uncovered
treatment were so "inextricably intertwined" with the true target of
the conspiracy that the plaintiffs suffered antitrust injury. As such,
Campos and his class then clearly suffered antitrust injury. Ticket pur-
chasers were the target of Ticketmaster's antitrust violations-no other
conceivable target existed. Thus, at the very least, the excess fees paid
by Campos and her class were so "inextricably intertwined" with the
injury Ticketmaster aimed to inflict that they suffered antitrust injury.
No 'Jump" needed to be made in Campos as was required in Mc-
Cready--from the defendants' targets of psychologists and the psycho-
therapy market to the seekers of treatment from those professionals in
that market. In Campos, the plaintiffs were the target-they bore the
entire service charge. Thus, Campos and his class suffered antitrust
injury under McCready and Brunswick: Ticketmaster's alleged antitrust
violations eliminated competition and injured consumers. It is diffi-
cult to imagine a stronger scenario demonstrating antitrust injury.
3. What Campos Accomplished
As Judge Arnold aptly pointed out in his dissent, the "unhappy
result of the holding in [Campos] is that it is now likely that no one
can bring a [s] ection 4 suit against Ticketmaster."95 Additionally, the
Supreme Court seemed to accept this statement with its denial of cer-
tiorari. Again, the district court and the Eighth Circuit were justified
in relying upon Associated General's analysis; however, factually, the
cases were very different. The district court's holding that Cam-
pos failed not only on the issue of antitrust injury but also on the other
maintenance requirements was wrong. And, specifically, conclusions
regarding indirect purchasers and antitrust injury by both the district
and the appellate courts were wrong under McCready. "[T]he one as-
pect of McCready that is clear is the Court's primary concern with
whether or not the plaintiff' s injury was of the type that the substan-
tive antitrust provision was intended to forestall and thus within the
core of Congressional concern in prohibiting the activity and provid-
ing a private remedy."96 Clearly, Campos and his class's allegations of
Ticketmaster's domination of the market and the resultant service
charges borne by concert-going consumers met the threshold require-
ments of antitrust injury and the other maintenance requirements,
and thus deserved advancement to the next stage of inquiry into the
substance of Ticketmaster's alleged antitrust violations.
95 Campos v. Ticketmaster Corp., 140 F.3d 1166, 1175 (8th Cir. 1998), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 865 (1999) (Arnold,J., dissenting).
96 Chouai, supra note 30, at 1033.
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IV. C=7Y OF PTSBURG U V WEST PENN POWER CO.-
ANOTHER MISTAKE?
A. The Third Circuit Was Clearly in the Dark
1. Background
In 1996, the City of Pittsburgh (City) sought to revitalize several
urban areas (Redevelopment Zones), transforming them into indus-
trial, commercial, and residential areas. At that time, Allegheny
Power and Duquesne Light were the only two utility companies au-
thorized to provide electric service in Allegheny County, which en-
compassed the Redevelopment Zones. Only Duquesne Light was
certified to actually service the Redevelopment Zones. The City
hoped that the introduction of competition would help the progress
of the Redevelopment Zones,97 but Pennsylvania state law afforded
utility companies natural monopolies. 98 In order for a utility com-
pany to operate in a certain geographic area, the utility had to obtain
certification from an independent administrative agency, the Penn-
sylvania Public Utility Commission (PUC) which approved rates and
areas of operation. A new provider could enter another's service area
only if it demonstrated that "the area's certificated utility [was] provid-
ing inadequate service to customers in the proposed new territory."99
Nevertheless, the City went ahead and solicited bids for electric utility
providers in the Redevelopment Zones, with Allegheny Power offering
a lower bid than Duquesne.' 00
97 City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn. Power Co., 147 F.3d 256 (3d Cir. 1998). The
City hoped that a choice of utility companies "in the Redevelopment Zones would
attract business and commercial and residential development to the Zones which, in
turn, would facilitate redevelopment in [those] areas." City of Pittsburgh v. West
Penn Power Co., 993 F. Supp. 332, 333 (W.D. Pa. 1998).
98 The Pennsylvania Legislature passed the Electricity Generation Customer
Choice and Competition Act, 66 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2801 (West Supp. 1999), to
gradually introduce competition within the "retail generation function of the electric
utility industry," but not the transmission and distribution of electricity, West Penn
Power, 147 F.3d at 260 & n.7. As such, the Third Circuit noted that while the statute
will
introduce some competition among electric service providers in Penn-
sylvania, it does not entirely displace the regulatory function of the PUC. Be-
cause [the Act] did not alter the statutory requirement that Allegheny Power
petition the PUC to amend its certificate, that Act's passage does not alter
our analysis in this case.
Id. at 260 (emphasis added).
99 West Penn Power, 147 F.3d at 260.
100 See id. at 261.
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The City also filed a "Petition for Support of Choice for Retail
Electric Service Within Certain Redevelopment Zones Within the City
of Pittsburgh" with PUC in late 1996, contesting Duquesne Light's ex-
clusive rights within the Redevelopment Zones; Allegheny Power later
filed its own application with PUG. 10' Both the City and Allegheny
Power sought competition in the Redevelopment Zones. Duquesne
Light opposed both petitions. In early 1997, an administrative law
judge held prehearing conferences and consolidated the City's peti-
tion and Allegheny Power's application.
In April of 1997, Duquesne Light and Allegheny Power an-
nounced their intention to merge, with Allegheny Power withdrawing
its PUC application. 10 2 As a result, the City brought suit against Du-
quesne and Allegheny, alleging violations of section 1 of the Sherman
Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act, and seeking an injunction of the
proposed merger under section 16 and damages under section 4 as a
result of "expending significant efforts to bring competition to the
Redevelopment Zones; paying higher, non-competitive rates for elec-
tric utility service generally; and losing the opportunity to have lower
electric service charges."10 3
The district court dismissed the City's suit for treble damages due
to a lack of antitrust injury. The court found that the alleged antitrust
violations did not lessen competition: because there had been no
competition in the Redevelopment Zones prior to initiation of the
City's suit, "neither the proposed merger nor the withdrawal of Alle-
gheny Power's application ha[d] lessened the competition within the
City or the choices of utility companies available to the City. °10 4 In
other words, the City's position had not changed: because "defend-
ants' agreement not to compete [had] not caused any change in the
market or any other anticompetitive effects, it [precluded] a finding
that the City [had] been injured."10 5
101 See id. at 260-61.
102 See id. at 261. Under the terms of the premerger agreement, "the two utilities
agreed that they would not file any applications with the government without prior
consultation and would not make any changes with respect to rates without first con-
sulting each other." Id.
103 Id. at 262.
104 City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 993 F. Supp. 332, 336 (W.D. Pa.
1998). This appears to have been a decision made on the merits. Even the Third
Circuit phrased the district court's dismissal as a "finding" resting upon the "allega-
tions of the complaint," thus looking at the merits of the case itself, not simply a
standing requirement." City of Pittsburgh v. West Penn Power Co., 147 F.3d 256, 259
(3d Cir. 1998).
105 West Penn Power, 993 F. Supp. at 336.
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The court also dismissed the City's suit for injunctive relief under
section 16 for lack of antitrust injury. While admitting that the mere
threat of loss was sufficient to confer standing for purposes of injunc-
tive relief, the court held that "the threat of a loss [was] necessarily
contingent upon possession of that which [was] threatened"-since
there was no competition before there was nothing to lose.10 6 Fur-
ther, the threat of loss was too speculative since PUC never approved
the City's petition for or Allegheny's application to provide service to
the Redevelopment Zones. 107
2. The Third Circuit Majority
The Third Circuit affirmed the district court, holding that the
City failed to establish the "necessary antitrust injury and causal con-
nection between the alleged antitrust violation and its injury." 08
Combining its discussion of causation and injury, 09 the court specifi-
cally held that the lessening of competition resulted not from the de-
fendants' proposed merger but from the regulatory nature of the
utilities industry itself"110 The court explained that there was no les-
sening of competition because the status quo was maintained: "[T]he
utilities' purported antitrust violation [could] only be said to have
been competition-neutral and as such, [was] not actionable.""'
Specifically regarding the alleged Sherman Act violation, the
Third Circuit held that "[s]ince the realization of competition [was]
in the hands of regulators there [was] no way that the City [could]
show that competition would have occurred absent the concerted ac-
tivity between the two utilities.""12 Similarly, the court dismissed the
claim under section 7 of the Clayton Act. "The only 'actual competi-
tion' that the City allege[d] in its complaint [was] the competition to
be able to provide electric power to the Redevelopment Zones, which
106 Id. at 337.
107 See id. Plaintiff relied on Blue Shield v. McCready, 457 U.S. 465 (1982). The
district court found the case unhelpful: "Because McCready had, in fact, already suf-
fered an injury[,] the case does not bear on the question before this Court of whether
or not plaintiff's prospective injuries are speculative or not." West Penn Power, 993 F.
Supp. at 337.
108 West Penn Power, 147 F.3d at 269.
109 See id. at 265 ("In this case, we find that determining whether antitrust injury is
present necessarily involves examining whether there is a causal connection between
the violation alleged and the injury.").
110 See id. at 266.
111 Id. at 266.
112 Id. at 267.
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[did] not constitute actual competition."' 1 3 Lastly, regarding injunc-
tive relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, the Third Circuit con-
cluded that, while injunctive relief existed for threatened loss, "[t]he
presence of the regulatory scheme and need for approval in connec-
tion with the choice of utilities to serve the Redevelopment Zones
[cut] the causal chain and convert[ed] what might have been deemed
antitrust injury in a free market into only a speculative exercise."1 1 4 In
other words, the City could show no impending harm because it had
lost nothing due to the proposed merger, and the withdrawal of Alle-
gheny Power's application revealed that an injunction would accom-
plish nothing.
According to the court, there was no competitive process due to
the regulatory restraints imposed on the market-the submission of
bids and filing of petitions did not equate to actual competition.11 5
Additionally, the introduction of competition into the market de-
pended upon PUC approval, which Allegheny Power never obtained.
Since the regulatory nature of the utilities industry was not one of the
evils which the antitrust laws intended to address and snuff out, the
Third Circuit held that the City failed to adequately allege antitrust
injury.
B. West Penn Power in a Different Light
The Third Circuit incorrectly affirmed the district court's dismis-
sal for lack of antitrust injury and it incorrectly concluded that the
alleged antitrust violations did not lessen competition, which was
dearly a decision on the merits. In doing so, the court skipped the
antitrust injury inquiry. But competition clearly existed before the
proposed merger of Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light, and their
proposed merger did sustain a finding of antitrust injury.
113 Id.
114 West Penn Power, 147 F.3d at 267-268. The court reached this conclusion based
on the record's lack of any indication that there was a likelihood that PUG would
grant Allegheny Power's application or that the PUC proceedings were mere formali-
ties. The court further reasoned that the City's petition, Allegheny's application, and
Duquesne's response all "make clear that PUC proceedings to amend Allegheny
Power's certificate were already being vigorously contested." Id. at 268.
115 See id. at 266. "Without demonstrating that there was competition, a plaintiff
cannot show that the defendants' actions have had or will have anticompetitive ef-
fects." Id. at 267.
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1. As Bright As Day, Duquesne and Allegheny Were Competitors
The Third Circuit not only skipped the standing analysis and
made a decision on the merits, but in doing so it erroneously con-
cluded that the defendants were never competitors." 6 The Third Cir-
cuit used a literal definition of competition-Allegheny Power and
Duquesne Light as service providers in the same area and at the same
time. But the court failed to consider the "competitive process"11 7
which existed under the statutory scheme and the potential for com-
petition that was never realized when Allegheny withdrew both its ap-
plication and its bid to service the Redevelopment Zones. Allegheny
Power and Duquesne Light were actual competitors under the statu-
tory structure itself. First, prior to and at the time of the suit, Alle-
gheny Power and Duquesne Light were in direct competition for both
PUC's approval to service the whole of Allegheny County and for
PUC's acceptance of their bids to service the Redevelopment Zones.
Further, PUC guidelines allowed a provider to service an already-certi-
fied area upon a determination that the certified utility was providing
inadequate service.118 The entire structure of the regulations was best
described as a competitive process, and no rule existed "that the par-
ties must be in head-to-head competition in the relevant market (as
opposed to head-to-head competition for the relevant market) before
the antitrust laws [would] apply."119 Thus, it was in Allegheny Power's
and Duquesne Light's best interests to keep abreast of and find ways
to "one-up" each other's charges and level of service, not only for pur-
poses of impressing PUC when applying for initial certification but
also if either utility chose to challenge the other's performance in an
already-certified area of Allegheny County.
Additionally, the actual sequence of events leads to the inference
that Allegheny Power and Duquense Light were competitors. The
Third Circuit observed that Duquesne Light's responses (filed with
PUC following Allegheny Power's application and the City's petition)
made "it clear that PUC proceedings to amend Allegheny Power's cer-
tificate were.., vigorously contested" by Duquesne Light. 20 The rea-
sonable conclusion to be drawn is that these two companies were
116 See id. at 265. The Third Circuit couched this as a "key" fact, but it was in fact a
conclusion-again, the court incorrectly made a decision on the merits and not on
the initial inquiry of antitrust injury.
117 Id. at 267. The Third Circuit shot down this description because in its opinion
"the competitive process [did] not even exist because of regulatory restraints." Id.
118 See id. at 260.
119 Id. at 271 (Heany, J., dissenting) (quoting Fishman v. Estate of Wirtz, 807 F.2d
520, 531 (7th Cir. 1986)).
120 rd at 268.
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competitiors-the threat felt by Duquesne Light prompted it to "vig-
orously contest," later compelling it to enter into merger negotiations
with Allegheny Power.
The City's request for bids to service the Redevelopment Zones
also leads to the same conclusion. Allegheny Power and Duquesne
Light submitted separate bids, characterized by the Third Circuit as
"significantly different.' 2' In its application, Allegheny Power ex-
pressly stated that "its prices would be substantially lower than Du-
quesne Light Company's."' 22 Again, the two utilities were competing
for the position of service provider. Even if the City selected only one
utility for the Redevelopment Zones, Duquesne Light and Allegheny
Power were competitors, each trying to convince PUC that it offered
the higher level of service for the cheaper price. Thus, not only did
the Third Circuit erroneously rule on the merits, but it also reached
the wrong conclusion-clearly, Duquesne Light and Allegheny Power
were indeed competitors.
2. Out of the Dark and Into the Light-Plaintiffs Adequately
Alleged Antitrust Injury
Under Brunswick and its progeny, the City adequately alleged an-
titrust injury, at least for purposes of section 16, and arguably for pur-
poses of section 4 as well. On the most basic level, the City alleged
that Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light conspired to deprive the
City of an opportunity to obtain less expensive electricity. By couch-
ing its holding in terms of antitrust injury, the Third Circuit in effect
held that Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light's behavior was not of
the type which the antitrust laws aspired to prevent.
However, the antitrust laws seek to protect consumers and to pro-
mote and preserve competition. The proposed merger eliminated all
choice from both the initial process of choosing utility companies and
possibly from within the same service area-when the only two PUG-
certified utility providers merged, a monopoly resulted in Allegheny
County. The merger robbed the City of two competitors for PUC cer-
tification, irrespective of whether the PUC or the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture would ever allow two utilities to operate in the same certified
area. Specifically, there would be no competition even regarding bids
proposed for serving the Redevelopment Zones. Additionally, the po-
121 Id. at 261.
122 Id. at 270 (Heaney, J., dissenting). Allegheny Power explained in its applica-
tion to PUC that "[it [was] certain that the potential for developing new, incremen-
tal electrical load in the Redevelopment Zones [would] be enhanced substantially if
electricity prices therein [were] as low as possible." Id.
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tential for competition within the Redevelopment Zones disappeared,
as well as for all of Allegheny County. Clearly, this was the type of
behavior which the antitrust laws sought to prevent, and it flowed
from the defendants' conduct rather than from the regulatory
scheme.
Specifically, under the Clayton Act, mergers which substantially
lessen competition or tend to create monopolies are prohibited.
Here, where Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light were the only two
utility companies which could have provided service to the Redevelop-
ment Zones, the proposed merger clearly lessened competition and
created a monopoly.123
There was also a restraint of trade under the Sherman Act.
[IT] he merger agreement destroyed the City's opportunity to obtain
less expensive electricity. A factfinder might well determine that
this opportunity was more than speculative; it was real enough to
cause Allegheny Power to file its application; it was real enough to
cause Duquesne Light Company to oppose the application; and it
was real enough to convince Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light
Company that a merger was the most effective way of avoiding com-
petition. In short, "the injury alleged by [the City] was precisely the
type of loss that the claimed violations of the antitrust laws would be
likely to cause."124
If the goal of the antitrust injury requirement is to make sure that
the behavior alleged is of the type which the antitrust laws were in-
tended to prevent,125 then itis hard to imagine what the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent if not behavior that not only lessens, but also
eliminates all competition and consumer choice. If these facts do not
fulfill the requirements for section 4, then, at the very least, antitrust
injury existed for purposes of injunctive relief under section 16, bar-
ring the merger and requiring that Allegheny Power either reinstate
its application with or reapply to PUC for certification within the Re-
development Zones.' 26
123 See id. at 271 (Heaney, J., dissenting).
124 Id. (quoting Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltime Research, 395 U.S. 100, 125
(1969)).
125 See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
126 SeeJacobson & Greer, supra note 29, at 283 (suggesting that the threshold is
lower for section 16).
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V. GEoRGE HA TG Co. v. Rozzs RoYcE MOTOR CARS, Ic.:
ANOTHER COURT MISTAKEN
A. The Second Circuit Ran Right Over Antitrust Injury
1. Background
In George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars, Inc.,127 plaintiff
George Haug Co. (Haug) sold and serviced Rolls Royce cars as an
authorized parts and service dealer in Manhattan. 128 Defendant Rolls
Royce Motor Cars, Inc. (Motor Cars) imported, sold, and distributed
Rolls Royce cars and parts and "controlled the market for parts with
respect to its automobiles known as the 'after market parts.""129 In
1996, Haug filed suit against Motor Cars alleging a conspiracy be-
tween Motor Cars and one of Haug's competitors, Carriage House
Motor Cars, Ltd. (Carriage House), to "drive [Haug] out of the busi-
ness of repairing and servicing Rolls Royce automobiles as an author-
ized service center, to restrain trade and to monopolize trade for parts
and services, and to discriminate against [Haug] so as to prevent
[Haug] from competing effectively.' 30
The Southern District of New York dismissed the suit, holding
that Haug failed to adequately allege antitrust injury. 3' The district
court noted that Haug alleged injury to itself,132 but that damage to
127 148 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 1998).
128 See id. at 138.
129 Id.
130 Id. Specifically, Haug alleged that
Rolls Royce officials were paid commercial bribes to [drive Haug out of busi-
ness]. In furtherance of the conspiracy, the amended complaint further as-
sert[ed] that preferences were given by Rolls Royce to Carriage House
consisting of more favorable credit and price terms to Carriage House with
respect to parts; payment of the rent of Carriage House; allowing Carriage
House a price differential and allowing Carriage House a more favorable
basis for reimbursements for warranty work; and also enabling Carriage
House to offer customers free work paid for by Rolls Royce while requiring
Haug to charge similarly situated customers.
Id.
131 See George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motorcars, Inc., No. 96-CIV.-3140, 1997
WL 563806, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997). The district court also concluded that
Haug failed to state a claim under sections 2(d)-(e) of the Robinson-Patman Act. See
id. at *4-5.
132 See id. at *2 ("[Haug] has alleged its own business losses, loss of future income
from allegedly having been 'forced out of business,' and loss from its 'inability to sell
its parts and goodwill.'").
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Haug was insufficient "unless it [was] accompanied by cognizable
damage to competition in the relevant market."' 33
Regarding the alleged violations of the Sherman Act, Haug made
two arguments in an effort to adequately allege antitrust injury. First,
Haug alleged that prior to its termination, Haug and Carriage House
accounted for eighty percent of the market of repairs on Rolls Royce
cars and that Haug's termination thus eliminated competition. 34
The district court, however, determined that nothing in the complaint
convinced it that Haug's elimination from the market resulted in a
decrease of available service outlets.'3 5 Further, the district court
noted that if Haug argued that Motor Cars' actions resulted in 100%
of the market concentration, such a "result would be an exclusive dis-
tributorship between [Motor Cars] and Carriage House," which is
legal under the Sherman Act.'3 6
Haug next alleged that its elimination gave Carriage House "an
advantage over other Rolls Royce dealers in selling new cars because
'consumers would believe that they would have to go to Carriage
House for warranty work and would probably not receive good treat-
ment if they bought their Rolls Royces from a dealer other than Car-
riage House.' '137 The district court found the claim speculative
because Haug never sold new automobiles-therefore, since Haug
was never a new car dealer, it lacked standing to assert antitrust injury
suffered by new car dealers.' 3 8
The district court also held that Haug failed to allege antitrust
injury under the Robinson-Patman Act. The court concluded that the
harm which Haug suffered due to price discrimination alone was in-
adequate to assert antitrust injury-again, the court required suffi-
cient allegations of injury to the market. 139
2. Second Circuit Majority
The Second Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of
Haug's Sherman Act claims, reasoning that Haug failed to adequately
allege antitrust injury. It agreed with the lower court's conclusion that
Haug failed to adequately allege antitrust injury because Haug did not
plead its own market share for repair and servicing of Rolls Royces or
133 Id.
134 See id.




139 See id. at *4.
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the market share absorbed by Carriage House resulting from Haug's
termination. Thus, no facts existed from which the court could con-
clude that there was a decrease in Rolls Royce service outlets resulting
from Haug's termination. 40 The Second Circuit additionally empha-
sized that Haug had no standing to assert antitrust injury on behalf of
Rolls Royce Dealerships because Haug was never a dealership. 141
B. The Second Circuit's Mistake in George Haug Co. -Following the
Supreme Court's Lead in Atlantic Richfield
The Second Circuit erroneously jumped to the merits of Haug's
antitrust claims and incorrectly held that Haug had not suffered anti-
trust injury, making a mistake similar to the one made by the majority
in Atlantic Richfield. The most apparent flaw in the Second Circuit's
decision arose from its requirement that for purposes of antitrust in-
jury "the challenged action [must have] had an actual adverse effect
on competition as a whole in the relevant market; to prove it [had]
been harmed as an individual competitor [would] not suffice."' 42 In
other words, Haug's status as a competitor, without allegations of loss
to the entire market, was not enough to meet the antitrust injury re-
quirement. However, Haug suffered antitrust injury. What the Sec-
ond Circuit labeled as "antitrust injury" really addressed whether
Haug adequately alleged and proved his antitrust claims.
1. Atlantic Richfield in Detail
The majority in Atlantic Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co.143 made
the same mistake as the Second Circuit. In Atlantic Richfield, USA Pe-
troleum, a discount-gasoline retailer, brought suit against Atlantic
Richfield (ARCO), a gasoline refiner, alleging that ARCO imposed
maximum resale price maintenance on those competitors of USA Pe-
troleum which sold ARCO's gasoline. 44 Specifically, USA Petroleum
140 See George Haug Co. v. Rolls Royce Motor Cars, Inc., 148 F.3d 136 (2d Cir.
1998).
141 See id.
142 Id. at 139 (quoting Capital Imaging v. Mohawk Valley Med. Assoc., Inc., 996
F.2d 537, 543 (2d Cir. 1993)).
143 495 U.S. 328 (1990).
144 USA Petroleum alleged that ARGO imposed the maximum resale prices on
dealers when ARCO adopted marketing strategies aimed at competing with in-
dependents such as USA Petroleum. These strategies included ARGO "[making]
available to its dealers and distributors such short-term discounts as 'temporary com-
petitive allowances' and 'temporary volume allowances,' and it reduced its dealers'
costs by, for example, eliminating credit card sales." Id. at 332. Such strategies re-
sulted in ARCO increasing its sales and market share. See id.
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alleged that ARGO and its co-conspirators eliminated competition
among ARCO-brand dealers, resulting in a fixed, artificially low price
for gas. This agreement in turn harmed the independent, non-ARCO
discounter-retailers such as USA Petroleum because consumers obvi-
ously wanted the cheapest gasoline, and USA Petroleum lost money.
The Supreme Court held that USA Petroleum did not suffer anti-
trust injury. The Court explained that, as a competitor, USA Petro-
leum's lost business and profits resulted only from its competitors'
lower, but not predatorily lower, prices. Thus, such a price war consti-
tuted competition, exactly what the antitrust laws work to preserve'4 5-
"[1] ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices are set,
and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not threaten
competition. Hence, they cannot give rise to antitrust injury."1 46 In
effect, "a firm that complains about the harm it suffered from [non-
predatory price] competition.., is really claiming that it was unable
to raise prices."' 47
2. A Defect in Atlantic Richfield
The Court in Atlantic Richfield most likely reached a sound final
result,148 but incorrectly labeled its holding in terms of "antitrust in-
jury." Arguably, the Court reached the merits of USA Petroleum's
claims and skipped the initial, and required, inquiry regarding anti-
trust injury. In so doing, the Court produced a deceptive holding that
spoke in terms of "antitrust injury" when in fact the court did not look
at the issue of antitrust injury at all.
Justice Stevens noted in his dissent in Atlantic Richfield that the
"Court undermine[d] the enforceability of a substantive price-fixing
violation with a flawed construction of section 4, erroneously assum-
ing that the level of a price fixed by a section 1 conspiracy [was] rele-
vant to legality and that all vertical arrangements conform[ed] to a
single model."'1 49 Clearly, ARCO's price-fixing arrangement was un-
lawful per se, so the only issue was whether USA Petroleum, as the
targeted competitor, could challenge the pricing scheme. The reason
145 See id. at 337 ("A competitor may not complain of conspiracies that set mini-
mum prices at any level." (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Corp. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585 n.8 (1986))).
146 Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 340.
147 Blair & Harrison, supra note 19, at 1554.
148 SeeJacobson & Greer, supra note 29, at 303 (noting that by "basing its decision
on antitrust injury grounds, the [Atlantic Richfield ] Court unnecessarily delayed the
demise of Albrecht seven more years, giving the precedent additional time to do more
damage in the lower courts").
149 Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 346 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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why the majority denied USA Petroleum standing-stemming from
the fact that USA Petroleum was merely a competitor of ARCO in the
vertical arrangement-was flawed because the antitrust laws also work
to protect competitors where competition is threatened. 150
The majority in Atlantic Richfield accepted that the price-fixing
scheme violated section 1 per se, but it "den[ied] USA standing to
challenge the arrangement because it [was] neither a consumer nor a
dealer in the vertical arrangement, but only a competitor of ARCO:
[t] he antitrust laws were enacted for 'the protection of competition, not
competitors."'1 51 But such a proposition should not "be read to deny all
remedial actions by competitors. When competitors are injured by
illicit agreements among their rivals rather than by the free play of
market forces, the antitrust laws protect competitors precisely for the
purpose of protecting competition."1 52 The Court itself in Klor's, Inc.
v. Broadway-Hale Stores, Inc. established that illegal coordination "is not
to be tolerated merely because the victim is just one merchant whose
business is so small that his destruction makes little difference to the
economy."1 53 Further, the Court in Brunswick said that "competitors
may be able to prove antitrust injury before.., competition is thereby
lessened."1 54 USA Petroleum suffered antitrust injury for purposes of
bringing a section 4 suit. This was antitrust injury, and the predatory
price-level distinction should have come into play only later upon an
examination of the merits.
150 See id. (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted two flaws with the major-
ity's opinion. Regarding the first flaw, he argued that section 1 is unrelated to
the level of the administered price at any particular point in time. A price
fixed by a single seller acting independently may be unlawful because it is
predatory, but the reasonableness of the price set by an illegal conspiracy is
wholly irrelevant to whether the conspirators' work product is illegal.
Id. at 353 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Further, the Court established in United States v.
Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 397 (1927), that reasonableness of price is no de-
fense to price-fixing.
Regarding the second flaw, the dissent argued that the vertical characterization
"[did] not limit its potential consequences to a neat category of injuries," given the
fact that the exact same consequences in the context of a horizontal conspiracy would
constitute antitrust injury. Atlantic Richfield Co., 495 U.S. at 355 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing). Additionally, the majority's "treatment of vertical maximum-price-fixing ar-
rangements necessarily assumes that all such conspiracies have the same competitive
consequences." Id. at 357 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 352 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (quoting Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962)).
152 Id. at 352-53 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
153 359 U.S. 207, 213 (1959).
154 Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 n.14 (1977).
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3. George Haug Co. and Atlantic Richfield-Two Wrongs Do Not
Make a Right
Atlantic Richfield's holding clearly was about whether the plaintiff
adequately alleged or proved ARCO's antitrust claims-"the real
problem was not antitrust injury. It was that [Atlantic Richfield], in
fact, had done nothing wrong. If indeed it set vertical price ceilings,
that conduct [was] usually procompetitive-as the Supreme Court re-
cently recognized in overruling Albrecht in State Oil Co. v. Khan.'u55
Similarly, Haug sufficiently alleged antitrust injury. However, the
Second Circuit jumped to the merits of Haug's antitrust claims and
incorrectly dismissed the case. As a result, the Second Circuit
achieved a result that undermined what the antitrust laws sought to
protect (competition) and defeated the purpose of having standing
requirements at all. That Haug was a "competitor" should not have
precluded Haug from adequately alleging antitrust injury. Forcing
competitors out of business hurts competition. When Haug went out
of business, competition was greatly reduced-eighty percent of the
market was originally serviced by only Carriage House and Haug, and
the elimination of Haug left consumers in that portion of the market
with very little choice. 15 6 While choice still existed, competition was
still harmed, and Haug suffered antitrust injury. Unfortunately, the
Second Circuit failed to appreciate the purpose of antitrust injury and
produced an opinion that merely added to the confusion regarding
private enforcement of the antitrust laws under section 4.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Eighth, Third, and Second Circuits all reached incorrect re-
sults on the issue of antitrust injury. The Campos decision left no one
to challenge Ticketmaster's practices since the decision barred the
concert goers, the only logical (and eligible under McCready) plain-
tiffs, from pursuing a suit for treble damages. Under McCready, Cam-
pos and his class suffered antitrust injury, and their allegations of
Ticketmaster's antitrust violations deserved a closer look. West Penn
Power Co. glossed over and inadequately addressed the issue of anti-
trust injury. Again, the plaintiff suffered antitrust injury, and its
claims against Allegheny Power and Duquesne Light should have
been examined after the prerequisites for standing were analyzed. Fi-
155 Jacobson & Greer, supra note 29, at 303; see also Blair & Lopatka, supra note 58,
at 135-41.
156 See George Haug Co., Inc. v. Rolls Royce Motorcars, Inc., No. 96-CIV.-3140,
1997 WL 563806, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 1997).
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nally, Haugfollowed the lead of the Court in Atlantic Richfield and also
produced a holding that spoke in terms of "antitrust injury," when in
reality the holding really had little to do with antitrust injury and
everything to do with the substance of the antitrust violations alleged
by Haug. Haug suffered antitrust injury for purposes of the standing
analysis, but the standing requirement was skipped, and the court's
decision instead rested on the merits.
To true Pearl Jam fans, no concert could possibly be complete
without the song Alive off the band's first album, regardless of
whether Ticketmaster did or did not distribute the tickets. Serious
fans consider the song a staple in the group's repertoire. Likewise,
when the "group" of Supreme Court Justices decided Brunswick in
1977, they too created a "staple"-antitrust injury became a required
element in the list of standing inquiries under sections 4 and 16 of the
Clayton Act. Brunswick and its progeny teach that private parties de-
serve a remedy under the antitrust laws only for those practices which
harm competition and consumers-"injury of the type the antitrust
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes
defendants' acts unlawful."' 5 7 At the same time, the standing inquir-
ies protect defendants from liability for practices which Congress did
not intend to sanction and monitor under the antitrust laws. The
plaintiffs in Campos, West Penn Power Co., and Haug did suffer antitrust
injury. In dismissing their claims, the Eighth, Third, and Second Cir-
cuits not only hurt the plaintiffs involved in these cases, but they also
chipped away at the very foundation of the antitrust laws themselves.
Because antitrust injury is a prerequisite for bringing suit under sections
4 and 16, there is no excuse for the courts' unpreparedness and incor-
rect conclusions-the issue of antitrust injury as a standing require-
ment always arises. Courts must realize and understand this, or
defendants' anti-competitive behavior will remain unchecked, and
plaintiffs will continue to be left with no recourse. Something was
"wrong" with the Eighth, Third, and Second Circuits' treatment of an-
titrust injury, and all courts need to learn from those errors in order
to prevent repetition. If anything positive is to come of the mistakes
made in Campos, West Penn Power Co., and Haug, it will hopefully be a
realization that antitrust injury is indeed "still alive."
157 Brunswick Corp., 429 U.S. at 489.
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